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vided, the Court will be faced again with
the issue of whether the use of expatriation
as a punishment is constitutional.
Three methods of approach are available
to the Court. First, the statute may be construed as only regulatory in purpose, and
the imposition of expatriation found reasonably related to a congressional power.
Secondly, a distinction in degree might be
drawn between subversive crimes, with expatriation being allowed only in those cases
where the acts done are inherently reflective
of a voluntary renunciation of citizenship.
Thirdly, the use of expatriation as a penalty
for a crime could be condemned as cruel and
unusual punishment and the section declared
unconstitutional.
If there is a discernible trend in this area,
it is away from any use of expatriation as
punishment. This attitude has been urged
by most commentators and international
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congressional legislation in this area are
the establishment of methods by which an
individual may voluntarily relinquish his
citizenship if he so desires, and the reduction and regulation of individuals holding
dual nationality. 3 The use of expatriation
as punishment has, in the past, been confined to primitive societies and dictatorial
states.8 4 Considering the inherent value of
American citizenship and the disabilities
attached to the condition of statelessness,
the use of expatriation merely as punishment is sufficiently arbitrary and capricious
to be classified as cruel and unusual punishment. The restriction of the use of expatriation to situations where it is uniquely necessary to avoid international tensions would
be more in accord with recent developments
of the law, and the tenets of a democratic
society which has traditionally recognized
the dignity of man.

organizations.2 The legitimate purposes of
32 See United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 15; Maxey, Loss of Nationality, 26 ALBANY L. REV. 151 (1962); Roche, The
Loss of American Nationality, 99 U. PA. L.
25, 70 (1950).

REV.

33 The primary purpose of the Nationality Act of
1940 was the reduction of dual nationals, a group
which has frequently caused international friction.
See Maxey, supra note 32, at 181-83.
34 ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM

277

(1951).

Recent Decision:
Married Students and
School Board Regulations
It seems fair to say that there would be far
fewer teenage marriages if our teenagers
were not so long in finding social recognition. To me it seems highly important that
society provide wholesome ways in which
adolescents can express their healthy and
natural desires to move into social adulthood as they approach physical and mental

adulthood.'
A school attendance officer recently filed
a petition in Family Court, seeking to compel a married fifteen-year old girl to attend
school. The girl refused to attend on the
ground that a housewife should not be

The Education Digest, April 1962, p. 17, quoting
Emily H. Mudd, Philadelphia Marriage Council.
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compelled to do so. The court, in dismissing the petition, held that a married female
child, when residing with and maintaining
a household for her husband, is exempted
from the operation of the compulsory education laws 2 which require full-time day
instruction of all minors between the ages
of 7 and 16 years. In the Matter of Rogers,
36 Misc. 2d 680, 234 N.Y.S.2d 172
(Family Ct. 1962).
American educators are very concerned
over the great increase in student marriages.
Boards of education have reacted by adopting numerous policies and enacting regulations restricting activities or attendance of
married students and otherwise attempting
to discourag high school student marTiaggs. 4 Some of the school boards' policies
in this area are so severe and objectionable
that they are challenged by court action.
The court in the Rogers case stated the
basic problem and policy question discussed
in every high school marriage case.
The real issue here, to this Court, goes
beyond whether this child ... should be
compelled to go to school against her will
under the circumstances. There remains a
very real problem as to the eflect resulting
from the association of a married fifteenyear old in school with other children of
the same age. 5
An awareness of the possible harmful effects
2 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3201-3229.
a N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3205(1)(a).
4 Kingston & Gentry, Married High School Students and Problem Behavior, 35 THE J. OF EDUC.
SOCIOLOGY 284 (1962); Bolmeir, Board of Educa-

tion's Right to Regulate Married Students, 1

J. FAMILY L. 172 (1961); 9 KAN. L. REV. 340
(1961); Hanson, Teen-age Marriages, NEA J.,
Sept. 1961, p. 26; Roach, Board Rules Concerning
Married Students, Am. School Bd. J., June 1958,
p. 56.

In the Matter of Rogers, 36 Misc. 2d 680, 681,
234 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (Family Ct. 1962).
(Emphasis added.)

married students may have on other impressionable school children and the acuteness of the social problems involved in
teenage marriages is necessary in order to
understand the courts' position in high
school marriage cases.
It is generally agreed that early marriages, especially between teenagers still
attending high school, should be discouraged. Investigators in this area have found
that 65% to 85% of married high school
girls "drop out" before graduation.G The
number of "drop-outs" among male married students is also on the increase. 7 The
divorce rate among couples who marry
when both parties are in their teens is about
twice as high as when both parties are between twenty and twenty-five years of age."
The need to discourage these marriages
becomes even more critical when one
realizes that the average age of both the
American groom and bride has dropped
considerably. In the year 1890, the average
wedding party consisted of a twenty-six
year-old groom and a twenty-two year-old
bride. Today, the young man is usually under twenty-three years old and his bride
only twenty. 9 In light of the fact that these
figures represent the median ages, one can
readily realize that those who fall into the
lower quartiles of this statistical study may
very well still be in their teen years and
still in high school."
GKerckhoff & Rimel, Early Marriage, 36 THE
CLEARING HousE 559, 560 (1962).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. Dr. Hanson, Superintendent of Schools of
Rock Island, Illinois, in discussing the lack of
success among high school marriages, reports that
"one study shows, for example, that among 240
married couples of school age, only 16 couples
were still living together after five years." Hanson,

supra note 4, at 27.
9 Hanson, supra note 4, at 26.
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What possible harmful effects can the
attendance of married couples have upon
their classmates? The courts mainly consider: (1) the behavioral and moral influence of these teenagers who have more
mature experiences and ideas than their
classmates and who are removed from
parental control and guidance, and (2)
more importantly, whether the presence of
married students will encourage other children to marry while in high school.
In the past, many local boards of education believed that expulsion, limitations on
attendance, segregation of married students,
and denial of participation in extra-curricular activities were necessary in order to
discourage other student marriages." Married students were to be treated as a special
problem group and marriage per se was
sufficient ground for these punishments.
There is no legal question as to the authority of a local board to adopt reasonable
policies and regulations for the efficient day-

sponsibility for the education of the young

is primarily divided among parents, the
church, and the state.'

The powers of the

state are substantial as is illustrated by the

fact that it can compel an unwilling parent
to send his child to school under a compulsory

education

law. 1 4

"The

State

is

sovereign in the matter of the attendance
of a child at school." 15

There may be a legal question, however,
as to the reasonableness of a specific regulation or its application. The courts recognize the local boards'

authority and the

expertness of board members, school trustees, and school administrators in the problems involved in the day-to-day conduct of
schools, including that of discipline. Therefore they will only strike down a board
regulation if a school board goes beyond

its authority by adopting or applying a rule
or policy that is unreasonable or arbitrary. 16
In most cases, a victim of an allegedly
unreasonable policy or rule initiates an ac-

to-day conduct of its schools.12 The re-

tion against school officials, but in the
Rogers case it was to the contrary. This is

10 Ibid. A wide variety of "guesses" have been
made to explain the great increase in early marriages that occurred in recent decades. Some of
the more popular are: (1) an increase in emphasis on marriage and the family in recent decades
leading to the belief that marriage is the be-all
and end-all of human existence; (2) an increase
in early social activity-many children are pushed
into social maturity and they date, experience romance, love, and sex earlier; (3) the lessening of
parental control and supervision of boy-girl relationships; (4) emphasis of the importance of sex
gratification as evidenced by the importance of the
sex motive in advertising; (5) war psychology, the
draft, and fear of "the bomb;" (6) early marriage
just manifests the teenager's desire to claim, "I am
an adult," in a society where the lines between
childhood and adulthood are blurred. See generally articles cited in notes 4 and 6, supra.
11 Kerchoff & Rimel, supra note 6, at 562.
'L Roach, supra note 4; see, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 2554(13); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1623
(Supp. 1961); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3614 (1959).

only the third reported case involving the
issue of whether or not a truant married

child may be compelled, by court action, to
attend school under a compulsory education law. All three cases involved married
13 For a philosophical discussion of the division

of responsibility for education among parents,
church, and state, see DUBAY, PHILOSOPHY OF THE
STATE As EDUCATOR (1959).
14 See, e.g., People v. Ekerold, 211 N.Y. 386, 105
N.E. 670 (1914); People v. McIlwain, 151 N.Y.
Supp. 366 (Del. County Ct. 1915).
15 De Lease v. Nolan, 185 App. Div. 82, 84, 172
N.Y. Supp. 552, 554 (3d Dep't 1918); accord, In
the Matter of Rogers, 36 Misc. 2d 680, 234
N.Y.S.2d 172 (Family Ct. 1962).
' Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390,
103 N.W.2d 569 (1960); State v. Board of Educ.,
202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957); Kissick v.
Garland Independent School Dist., 330 S.W.2d
708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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female high school students under sixteen
years of age and their results were identical.
The first two were Louisiana cases"7 and
that State's Supreme Court held in both
cases that Louisiana's compulsory education laws do not apply to married students
for they have been "irrevocably emancipated" by marriage. In the Rogers case, a
New York court faced with the same issue
also decided that the compulsory education
laws did not apply to minors who enjoyed
a marital status. The Court in considering
the possible harmful effects of "forcing the
association of a married fifteen year-old
female with school children of such young
and impressionable ages, especially where
the former is not disposed to attend
school. .. ." recognized that "the issue goes
to the health, safety and welfare of more
than just this respondent.""8
The Louisiana decisions"' relied on the
wording of the Louisiana compulsory education law2 0 which apply to any child up to
the age of 16. The courts reasoned that
since all married students are emancipated
from parental control, they cannot any
longer be considered children and therefore
the laws do not apply to them.2 1 On the
other hand, the New York decision could
not rely on wording, for the New York
statute 22 applies to any minor up to the age
of 16. The Court in the Rogers case found
the compulsory education law to be inapplicable on the ground that it was doubtful
17

whether the legislature gave any thought to
the situation involved in the case. The
Court went on to exempt married students
from the compulsory attendance law for
the policy reasons discussed above.
The only dissent to the rulings of the
Louisiana and New York courts is found
in two Ohio cases that imply, in dicta, that
if the Ohio courts were presented with the
same situation, they would rule differently. 2 3 In the first of these decisions the
Ohio Supreme Court stated2 4 that although
marriage leads to truancy, it is no excuse
for truancy under the Ohio compulsory education laws. The public policy of the state
is that all children will have an education
because an education is necessary to expose
a child to his own potentialities and a free
society cannot exist and advance without
educated members. A very recent lower
court opinion commented on this case. "It
is apparent that the Supreme Court was of
the opinion that marriage would not constitute a valid reason for failing to attend
school in compliance with the compulsory
attendance laws." 2
It is quite unusual for a school board to
attempt to compel a married child to attend
school. Most married student cases involve
board regulations that attempt to limit,
deny, or restrict attendance. The two earliest higher court cases involving married
high school students grew out of school
board regulations designed to prohibit married girls from attendance. The first case' 0

In re State in Interest of Goodwin, 214 La.

1062, 39 So. 2d 731 (1949); State v. Priest, 210
La.
389, 27 So. 2d 173 (1946).
18 In the Matter of Rogers, supra note 15, at 681,

234 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
'9 Supra note 17.
20

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:221 (1950).

21

In re State in Interest of Goodwin, supra note

17; State v. Priest, supra note 17.
2
2N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3205(1) (a).

State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174, 151 N.E.2d
709 (1958); State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 175
N.E.2d 539 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
24 State v. Gans, supra note 23.
State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, supra note 23,
at 541.
26 McLeod v. State, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737
23

(1929).
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was concerned with an ordinance of a
Mississippi school board barring married
students from school even though they
might in all other respects be eligible to
attend. In declaring this ordinance to be
"arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore
void," the court rejected the following contentions made by the board:
[1] the admission of married children as
pupils... would be detrimental to the good
government and usefulness of the schools
... [2] marriage emancipates a child from
all parental control of its conduct, as well
as such control by the school authorities;
[3] the marriage relation brings about views
of life which should not be known to unmarried children .... 27
The court said that marriage can be refining and elevating rather than demoralizing
and concluded that it was commendable
that married students wished to further their
education.
In that same year, a Kansas court allowed a married girl, whose husband had
abandoned her with a child conceived out
28
of wedlock but born in wedlock, to attend.
The court held that her marriage and its
surrounding circumstances should not prevent her from gaining an education.
Although no court has allowed a school
board to expel a child solely on the grounds
that she was married, courts do seem ready
to allow boards to adopt regulations re2 '
stricting attendance. A Tennessee court
upheld a school board resolution which
temporarily expelled students for the remainder of the term if they wed during the
school term, or for the term immediately
following their marriage if they wed during
27

Id. at 474-75, 122 So. at 738.

Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 Pac.
1065 (1929).
29 State v. Board of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302

a vacation period between terms. This rule
was adopted because the school board believed that confusion and disorder usually
occurred immediately after the marriage
and during the period of readjustment. The
court upheld the resolution as being reasonable and voiced its confidence in the
professional judgment of the local school
administrators who prompted its adoption.
It reasoned that whatever might be said
concerning permanent expulsion, a temporary suspension for a short period is not
unreasonable if it is for the good of the
school.
Some secondary schools still expel students
who marry. More often nowadays it is the
practice to require that students who marry
resign from all extra-curricular activities,
including competitive sportsA0
Generally, the latest high school marriage
cases deal with the question of whether this
new tool of the school board has been reasonably used. A Texas court, in 1959,
upheld a resolution restricting married
students to classroom work. 31 A great deal
of weight was placed upon the results of a
P.T.A. study indicating the ill effects of
married students participating in extracurricular activities, particularly with unmarried students.
A Michigan court, in the following year,
upheld a similar regulation? 2 This case is
most interesting, for instead of unanimously
following the Texas decision, the court was
evenly divided. Four judges voted to reverse
the lower court ruling upholding the regulation and four voted to affirm, but one of
the judges affirmed on the procedural
ground that the whole issue was moot
30 The P.T.A. Magazine, Sept. 1962, p. 26.

Kissick v. Garland Independent School Dist.,

28

31

S.W.2d 57 (1957).

330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
52 Cochrane v. Board of Educ., 360 Mich. 390,
103 N.W.2d 569 (1960).
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since the boys involved had already graduated from school. The closeness of this
decision, according to one writer,3 3 reflects
the courts' growing unwillingness to allow
the school boards to try to discourage high
school marriages by discriminatory, punitive, or other means. This interpretation is
not as yet supported by court decisions.
Courts have upheld all school board regulations, short of complete expulsion, in
every case, including this one. There seems
to be a presumption of validity in favor of
a school board's regulation. 3 ' On the other
hand, the Michigan decision may be an
indication of the trend which future litigation in this area will take.
The few cases that have been decided in
the area thus far seem to establish the
following rules: (1) married students cannot be compelled to attend school under
compulsory education laws; (2) married
students cannot be permanently expelled
solely because they are married; (3) temporary and limited expulsion or suspension
may be permitted; (4) restrictions and
limitations on extra-curricular activities are
permitted.
The divided court in the Michigan case,
along with the current opinions and comments of many superintendents of schools
and writers in the field of education, signal
a coming change in this area. Restrictions,
including those in extra-curricular activities,
have proven ineffective in stemming the
tide of teenage marriages.3 5 Many have
concluded that it is questionable whether
3 Bolmeir, Board of Edncation's Right to Regulate Married Students, I J. FAMILY L. 172, 180

(1961).
3-1See, Cochrane v. Board of Educ., supra note 31,
at 571.
37 See, Kingston & Gentry, Married High School
Students and Problem Behavior, 35 THE J. OF
EDUC. SOCIOLOGY 284, 285 (1962).

punitive and regulatory measures are the
answer to this social problem.3 6 One Illinois
school superintendent has stated, "like it
or not, we must meet the situation with
something more than disapproval and ostracism." 3 1
The negative approach of the past is
quickly losing favor among school officials.
Its downfall is being hastened by surveys
s
and studies in the area. A recent survey,
by the State Department of Education on
disciplinary problems in Georgia schools,
found that as a group married students do
not create major disciplinary problems
while in high school. The most frequent
types of misbehavior found among married
students are similar to those found most
frequently among all high school pupils.
Similar surveys have led many of the current writers to conclude that, generally,
there should be no particular regulation of
married students and they should be afforded the same treatment and regulation
as all other high school students3 9 "We

36 See, e.g., Bolmeir, supra note 33; Kerckhoff &

Rimel, Early Marriage, 36

THE CLEARING

HOusiE

559 (1962). The authors of this latter article state
at p. 562, "The best study that tried to link school
policy to marriage rate found very little relationship." The authors were both members of the
Michigan Youth Commission which will publish,
in the latter part of this year, the findings of its
studies on early marriages and the problems associated with them. A copy of this publication may
be obtained by writing to the Michigan Youth
Commission, 1447 Washington Heights, Ann
Arbor, Michigan.
37Hanson, Teen-age Marriages, NEA J., Sept.
1961, p. 28.
3 Kingston & Gentry, supra note 35, at 285. Of
the 420 schools that responded to a questionnaire,
96.32% either saw no difference in the behavior
of married and unmarried students or described
married students as better behaved.
39 See, e.g., 9 KAN. L. REV. 340 (1961); Opinion
Poll, The Nation's Schools, Nov. 1956, p. 86.

